Salt Lake City v. Isaac Jeppson : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
Salt Lake City v. Isaac Jeppson : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeanne Robison; Associate Salt Lake City Prosecutor; Attorney for Appellee.
Robert Breeze; Attorney for Defendant; Attorney for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake City v. Jeppson, No. 20010407 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3313
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff /Appellee, 
vs. 
ISAAC JEPPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20010407 
Priority Classification No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE FOR DOG AT 
LARGE AND ATTACKING DOG IN VIOLATION OF SALT LAKI 
CITY ORDINANCES, HONORABLE ROBIN REESE PRESIDING 
ROBERT BREEZE #4278 
Attorney for Defendant 
213 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 322-2138 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jeanne Robison 
Associate Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellee 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 0 8 2001 
Pauiette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff /Appellee, 
vs. 
ISAAC JEPPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Court of Appeals Case No. 20010407 
Priority Classification No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE FOR DOG AT 
LARGE AND ATTACKING DOG IN VIOLATION OF SALT LAKE 
CITY ORDINANCES, HONORABLE ROBIN REESE PRESIDING 
ROBERT BREEZE #4278 
Attorney for Defendant 
213 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 322-2138 
Attorney for Appellant 
Jeanne Robison 
Associate Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
STATEMENT OF PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS . . . . " ii 
STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION . 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW . 1,2 
WHERE OBJECTION CAN BE FOUND IN THE RECORD 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND 
REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2,3,4,5 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 5,6 
ARGUMENT 6 ,7 
POINT I 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 6 ,7 
POINT II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT 
ALLOWED THE DOG TO ATTACK OR RUN AT LARGE . 7,8 
CONCLUSION 8,9 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 9 
-i-
ADDENDUM 10 
A-l The Text of the Ordinances 11 
A-2 Judgment 12 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
American Fork City v. Rothe. 12 P.3d 108 (UT. App. 2000) 2 
Butler. Crockett & Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co.. 909 
P.2d 225, 231 (UT. 1995), cited in State v. Real Property at 633 E. 640 N.. 942 P.2d 925 
(UT. 1997) 6 
State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (UT. 1980) 8 
State v. Maguire. 975 P.2d 476 (UT. App. 1999) 2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
None 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
78-2a-3(2)(e) U.C.A 1 
76-1-103 UCA 2,8 
76-2-103 UCA 2,8 
S.L.C. Ordinance 8.04.010 2 
PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS 
There have been no prior or related appeals. 
-ii-
BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff /Appellee, 
vs. 
ISAAC JEPPSON, 
Defendant/Appellant. Court of Appeals Case No. 20010407 
Priority Classification No. 2 
STATEMENT OF SUBJECT MATTER AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
1. The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 78-2a-
3(2)(e) U.C.A. 
2. The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on 4-12-01, a 30-day extension of 
time in which to file Notice of Appeal having been signed by the trial court 
on 3-13-01. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err by failing to conduct a hearing on defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence for Miranda violation? 
2. Did the trial court err by finding defendant guilty in Counts II and III 
despite the lack of any evidence that defendant "allowed" the dog to attack 
or run at large? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue of whether the trial court should have conducted an evidentiary 
hearing on defendant's motion to suppress evidence for Miranda violation 
appears to be a question of law. Questions of law are reviewed for 
correctness. State v. Maguire. 975 P.2d 476 (UT. App. 1999). 
2. When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence this court must 
sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence or if the court reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made. American Fork City v. Rothe. 12 P.3d 108 (UT. App. 
2000). 
WHERE OBJECTION CAN BE FOUND IN THE RECORD 
Defendant's motion for a new trial based upon the trial court's failure to rule on 
defendant's motion to suppress for Miranda violation can be found at R. 144. The motion 
to suppress can be found at R. 44. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, 
AND REGULATIONS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL OR OF 
CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
are: 
Defendant assents that the controlling provisions of law with respect to this case 
1. 76-1-103UCA 
2. 76-2-103 UCA 
3. S.L.C. Ordinance 8.04.010 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged in a 3 count information with violating an assortment of 
animal control violations under the Salt Lake City ordinances, to wit: Count I, failure to 
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license dog, S.L.C. Ordinance 78.04.070; Count II, allowing animal to run at large, S.L.C. 
Ordinance 8.04.340; and Count III, dog attack, S.L.C. Ordinances 8.04.410, allegedly 
occurring on 6-9-00 R.1 (See addendum A-l for THE TEXT OF THE ORDINANCES). 
Defendant appearing pro se entered a plea of not guilty, and a pretrial conference 
was set for August 21, 2000. R.6 
On August 21, 2000, a bench trial was set for September 11, 2001, R.6 and 
discovery material was provided directly to defendant, R.14 
Mr. Louis Francis, Esq. of the firm Jones Waldo Holbrook and McDonough 
entered an appearance on September 9, 2000, sought discovery and had the September 
11, 2000 bench trial date vacated and the matter rescheduled for a disposition hearing on 
October 16, 2000. R.15, 18, 22, 25. 
On October 16, 2000 new counsel, Robert Breeze, was authorized to substitute as 
counsel for defendant, R.33 and a motion to suppress and memorandum in support was 
then filed. R.44 
On December 1, 2000 attorney Breeze filed a motion to strike the suppression 
hearing and have his motion to withdraw as counsel heard instead on December 11, 2000. 
R.48, 50. The prosecution stipulated that the motion to suppress be replaced by counsel's 
motion to withdraw. R.52. Judge Reese entered a handwritten note "striking the motion 
to suppress". R.53 
On December 11, 2000 the parties appeared before the court, counsel Breeze was 
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authorized to withdraw and the matter was set for bench trial with defendant once again 
appearing pro se on February 12, 2001 (Hearing Transcript 12-11-00). 
The matter came on for bench trial on February 12, 2001, defendant appearing pro 
se. (Trans. Trial 2-12-01). The court heard the evidence and found defendant not guilty 
of count I, but guilty of counts II and III (Trial Trans. 2-12-01 at 56-58). 
Following trial on February 12, 2001 the court sentenced defendant to a $67.00 
fine on Count II, dog at large and 30 days jail suspended on good behavior probation and 
payment of $250.00 fine. (Trial Trans. 2-12-01 at 61-62) (R. 63). (See addendum A-2 for 
a copy of the judgment). 
The City then followed up with a motion to destroy the dog dated March 5, 2001, 
filed March 6, 2001 and a memorandum in support. (R. 64, 67). 
Counsel Breeze then reappeared on March 13, 2001 and obtained an order 
extending time to appeal by 30 days. (R. 125, 127, 129). 
Counsel Breeze then filed an opposition to the City's motion seeking destruction 
of dog (R. 131) and a motion for a new trial and a memorandum in support. (R. 144, 
146). 
Counsel Breeze then filed a Notice of Appeal on April 12, 2001, (R. 150) noting 
thereon that the appeal might be premature because the motion to destroy dog was still 
pending as well as a motion for new trial (which may have been untimely, depending on 
how the trial court defined the word "sentence".) 
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On April 30, 2001 the court, by minute entry, denied defendant's motion for a new 
trial as well as the City's motion for destruction of the dog. (R.178) 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the statements he allegedly made 
on 6-9-2000 to the Animal Control Officer Deborah Snyder. R.44. 
2. The court concluded that the evidence which supported the conclusion that 
defendant was in "care, custody or control of the dog" was the confession 
which defendant sought to have suppressed. (Tr. Trans. 2-12-01 at 57:11-
19, see the animal control officer's testimony at Tr. Trial 2-12-01 at 10:16-
25) 
3. Although defendant's counsel filed a motion to strike the MTS hearing of 
12-11-00 (R.50) and the City so stipulated (R.52) so that the motion to 
withdraw as counsel could be heard, there was never any effort to strike the 
motion itself. 
4. The court never ruled on the motion to suppress. 
5. There was no evidence adduced at trial that this defendant "allowed" the 
dog to be at large or to attack on 6-9-00. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant argues that he should be awarded a new trial because the trial court 
failed to rule on his motion to suppress evidence for Miranda violation prior to trial. The 
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defendant also argues that this court should enter a judgment of acquittal as to counts II 
and III of the information because, absent the confession which should have been 
suppressed, the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
had care, custody or control of the animal in question. Further the prosecution failed to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant "allowed" the dog to attack or run at 
large. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
The defendant filed a motion to suppress for Miranda violation on October 24, 
2000. R. 44. Defendant's counsel later filed a motion to strike the suppression hearing of 
12-11-00 so that his motion to withdraw could be heard. R. 50. However, it is important 
to note that the request was to strike the suppression hearing of 12-11-00, not a motion to 
strike the motion to suppress. 
When defendant began to proceed pro se on 12-11-00 the motion to suppress was 
still pending before the court. 
The trial court does not have the discretion to decline to decide a legal question 
properly presented to it. Butler, Crockett & Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest 
Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (UT. 1995), cited in State v. Real Property at 
633 E. 640 N.. 942 P.2d 925 (UT. 1997). 
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When the court commenced the trial in this matter there was an outstanding 
motion to suppress pending which, if ruled on in defendant's favor, would have resulted 
in a verdict of not guilty on counts II and EL At Tr. Tran. 2-12-01 at 57:6 the court stated 
"...that whether you own the dog or not, there's been evidence sufficient to satisfy me 
beyond a reasonable doubt that you either had charge or control of this animal or custody 
of the animal, even if you weren't the actual licen-owner, excuse me, of the animal. In 
fact, officer Snyder testified that you admitted to her that you were in charge of the dog, 
the citation should be issued to you because your mother was out of town and wouldn't 
back for a couple of days." 
If defendant had prevailed on his motion to suppress the foregoing confession 
upon which the trial court relied would never have been admitted at trial and there would 
have been insufficient evidence to establish care, custody or control over the animal. 
Point II 
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT 
ALLOWED THE DOG TO ATTACK OR RUN AT LARGE 
Although the City Ordinances in question purport to create strict liability offenses 
the language of the ordinances requires that a defendant "allow" a dog to run at large or 
to attack. 
The definitional scheme defines "allow" to mean "...human conduct that is 
intentional, deliberate, careless, inadvertent or negligent in relation to the actions of an 
animal." Salt Lake City Ordinance 8.04.010. 
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76-1-103 of the Utah Code provides in relevant part that "The provisions of this 
code [criminal code] shall govern the construction of the punishment for and defenses 
against any offense ...defined outside of this code;". 
In other words Utah state law governs the definitions to be applied to criminal 
offenses within the State of Utah. 
The Utah Criminal Code only recognizes four mental elements as set forth at 76-2-
103 of the Utah Code, intentionally, knowingly, recklessly and with criminal negligence. 
The Salt Lake City Code is inconsistent with the Utah Code to the extent that it 
attempts to incorporate mental elements not recognized by state law, including careless, 
inadvertent, or negligent. Under State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (UT. 1980) 
City Ordinances are not permitted to be inconsistent with the policy of state laws. 
Under the preemption doctrine the mental state for dogs at large and attacking 
dogs should be limited to intentional or deliberate conduct. 
There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the defendant deliberately or 
intentionally allowed the dog to run at large or to attack the puppy of the neighbor. As a 
result, the trial court should have dismissed the charges at the close of the prosecution 
case or found the defendant not guilty at the close of all the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The court should remand for a new trial, including a hearing on defendant's 
motion to suppress. In the alternative, the court should enter an acquittal on counts II and 
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Ill based upon insufficient evidence to find that defendant "allowed" ttedog to attack or 
run at large. 
DATED this ' day of October, 2001. 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I personally matted "2-- true and correct copies of the foregoing to: 
Jeanne Robison 
Associate Salt Lake City Prosecutor 
349 South 200 East, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
this 7 day of October, 2001 / U l / A - ^ 
9 
ADDENDUM 
10 
A-1 
Relevant Salt Lake City Ordinances 
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^cumen t Page 1 of 1 
8.04.390 Animals Running At Large: 
A, With the exception set forth in subsection B of this Section, it is unlawful for the owner or 
person having charge, care, custody or control of any animal to allow such animal at any time to run 
at large. The owner or person charged with responsibility for an animal found running at large shall be 
strictly liable for a violation of this Section, regardless of the precautions taken to prevent the escape 
of the animal and regardless of whether or not such owner or person knows that the animal is running 
at large. Any person violating any provision of this Section shall be deemed guilty of a civil violation 
and shall be penalized as provided in Appendix A of this Chapter and Chapter 2.75 of this Code, or its 
successor. 
B. Dogs shall be permitted to run off-leash only in areas of parks and public spaces specifically 
authorized by City ordinance, specifically designated by the Director of Public Services as "off-leash 
areas", and clearly identified by signage as such. Said areas shall be as follows: 1) designated areas of 
Memory Grove Park known as the Freedom Trail Section, 2) the Municipal Ball Park, also known as 
Herman Franks Park, except for the fenced youth baseball diamonds and playground area, 3) 
designated areas of Jordan Park, and 4) designated areas of Lindsey Gardens. While in such areas 
dogs shall at all times remain under control of the dog's owner or custodian. "Under control" means 
that a dog will respond on command to its owner or custodian. The foregoing notwithstanding, the 
Public Services Department may conduct additional experiments in other areas of the City for possible 
future legislative enactment establishing such areas as "off-leash areas", provided such experiments are 
conducted in accordance with the guidelines approved by the City Council in its Resolution 101 of 
1999. (Ord. 31-00 § 2, 2000: Ord. 102-99 § 1, 1999: Ord. 83-99 § 1, 1999: Ord. 84-98 § 1, 1998: 
Ord 67-98 § 1, 1998: Ord. 24-89 § 2, 1989: prior code § 100-1-10) 
^Jcument Page 1 of 1 
8.04.410 Dogs Attacking Persons And Animals: 
A. Attacking Dogs: It is unlawful for the owner or person having charge, care, custody or 
control of any dog to allow such dog to attack, chase or worry any person, any domestic animal 
having a commercial value, or any species of hoofed protected wildlife, or to attack domestic fowl. 
"Worry", as used in this Section, means to harass by tearing, biting or shaking with the teeth. 
B. Owner Liability: The owner in violation of subsection A of this Section shall be strictly liable 
for violation of this Section. In addition to being subject to prosecution under subsection A of this 
Section, the owner of such dog shall also be liable in damages to any person injured or to the owner of 
any animal(s) injured or destroyed thereby. 
C. Defenses: The following shall be considered in mitigating the penalties or damages or in 
dismissing the charge: 
1. That the dog was properly confined on the premises; 
2. That the dog was deliberately or maliciously provoked. 
D. Dogs May Be Killed: Any person may kill a dog while it is committing any of the acts 
specified in subsection A of this Section, or while such dog is being pursued thereafter. (Prior code § 
100-1-14) 
B. "Allow", for the purposes of this Ordinance, shall include human conduct that is intentional, 
deliberate, careless, inadvertent or negligent in relation to the actions of an animal. 
A-2 
Judgment 
12 
3ITY/STATE 
-VS-
Third District Court, State of Utah 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
450 South State Street, P.O. Box 1860, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - i860 
SENTENCE/JUDGMENT/COMMITMENT/ORDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
Case Number (() C ) H \ I l ^ l ^ T 
Tape number j C # ~ ^ T , 0 S" 
Plaintiff 
U Defendant 
DOB: 
Interpreter. 
CHARGES 11 
Plaintiff Counsel 
Defense Counsel 
Amended & 
THE COURrSENTENCED W E DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
(1) Jail _ Suspended 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence 
(2) Fine Amt. $ 
sffiw 
nJ^ 
Fee$_ Fine Bal $. 
TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $
 v 
Payment Schedule: Pay $. 
(3) Court Costs $ 
per month/1 st Pmt. Due Last Pmt. Due ^ S ~ I3j<r)i 
(4) Community Service/WP_ 
(5) Restitution $ 
through 
Attorney Fees $ 
(6) Probation \ ^ M £ ^ v 
Pay to: • Court • Victim • Show Proof to Court 
Good Behavior • AP&P • ACEC • Other 
(7) Terms of probatfbn: 
yfjvlo Further Violations 
(O AA Meetings , / w k . 
• Counseling thru. 
. / month • Classes 
D Follow Profjrar 
n N o b\rr:hr.\ 
>H A;HILMJSI; 
D Employment _ 
D Proof of 
In/Out TrC:p.tr 
Health "H-c-r-
_. . wTi f j " *^ i_oi< ' .'«/\.«;\.l. 
W V V l ^ - t 
(8) Plea in Abeyance Diversion 
(9f) Review. /
 m . / at m 
i AAr\j^\\, v js 'wv-^- -4 •- - r ->~ 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third District 
Court at 238-7391, at least three working days prior to the proceeding.' District Court Judge 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGEMENT 
Q^^T ':3l'dJQx 
